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A STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE NATURALISTIC
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A STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE NATURALISTIC
PHILOSOPHIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE IN AMERICA

by

James Michael Graham

A Thesis
Submitted to the
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in partial fulfillment
of the
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WE HEREBY APPROVE THE THESIS SUBMITTED BY

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ENTITLED A STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE NATURALISTIC PHILOSOPHIES

IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN AMERICA

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James Michael Graham

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

It has generally been deemed appropriate to examine the development of the methods of political inquiry as practiced in America. Part of the reason for these examinations is that there remains no general agreement on the nature and significance of the varieties of approaches present in contemporary political science.¹

The causes of this disparity appear to be fourfold. First, there has been a neglect in identifying what environmental, institutional, and intellectual factors were influential in the development of various approaches to political study. The second puzzle, which is related to the first, is the inability to arrive at a common evaluation of past social thought and how it, combined with philosophical traditions, influenced the study of politics.

¹A number of histories of the discipline have been made for a variety of reasons. See: Anna Haddow, Political Science in American Colleges and Universities 1636-1900 (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1939); Charles Merriam, New Aspects of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925); Dwight Waldo, Political Science in the United States of America (Paris: UNESCO, 1956); Bernard Crick, The American Science of Politics, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964); Francis J. Sorauf, Political Science: An Informal Overview (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1965); Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, The Development of American Political Science: From Burgess to Behavioralism (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967); Marian D. Irish, ed., Political Science: Advance of the Discipline (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968).

A third problem is, that there continues to be a good deal of misconception as to what constitutes the various approaches in American political science. What one scholar may call scientific, another might not accept as such, since the requirements might differ.

A final condition is the presence of a constant preoccupation political scientists have in identifying the inadequacies of each others' methods. This has no doubt influenced the way in which one might perceive or characterize the development or effect of a particular or group of approaches.

With the movement of naturalistic philosophies into the social sciences, I am concerned with what extent these philosophies of pragmatism and positivism were reflected in the growth of political science.

More traditional political science has generally been associated with the accumulation of facts about the composition, functions, rationale, success, and failure of legal governments. It has been institutional in focus and eclectic in its approach. Most of its work, and that of post-behavioralists also, can be classed into four categories--historical, analytical, prescriptive, and descriptive - taxonomic.

The historical approach involves the tracing of an event through time. In politics it is the history of various institutional forms and the historical aspects of any subject.

The chief aim of the analytical method is the analysis of a body of data or policy with the aim of clarifying terms, defining component elements and explaining logical relationships. This

includes ideas of the state, law, institutions, rights and justice. It is thus often the concern of political philosophy.

The part of political literature that is normative in character to the point of arguing for the establishment or reform of public policy, is what is meant by prescriptive. Thus its identifying feature is that it seeks to promote a value rather than attempting clarity.

The descriptive-taxonomic are those efforts to gather and classify facts so as to use them to describe political institutions and processes.

If the past twenty-five years has provided us with any agreeable methodological trends, it is that American political science has experienced the rise and dominance of an orientation towards political inquiry known as behavioralism. Its rise to prominence has been felt in every subfield of the discipline.

In tracing this development I will contend that although behavioral orientation has been easily recognized it has often been misunderstood. The common form of this misunderstanding is to view behavioral adherents as being in close philosophical agreement.

It is a major thesis of this study that intellectual movements have generally been neglected in the development of the discipline of political science. Perhaps the main reason for this is that philosophical traditions have often been slight, inconsistent, or indirect. Philosophical traditions are often received indirectly or even unconsciously, as they are transmitted to a

a great extent in organizations, and intertwined with other factors such as ideology, technology, and the environment.

It is because of this complexity that one major focus of this study will be the examination of the role of recent presidents of the American Political Science Association who symbolize disciplinary posture and change. This undertaking involves the identifying of persons on the top of the general informal strata of the discipline. These major figures will be joined to the general philosophical and intellectual currents that they characterized.

Regarding the evaluation of political science by focusing on the works and reputation of past colleagues, Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus have written that it tells us:

a good deal about the discipline itself--the existence or absence of consensus, the type of accomplishments which commends itself to one's colleagues, and the level of attainment that marks an individual as outstanding in American political science.¹

This then is a study of the development and current position of various methodologies in political science. It is traced in a manner which permits both some understanding of methodological development and perspective.

The scope of this study covers developments only up until 1970. This cutoff point is not an arbitrary decision but reflects changes in the representativeness of the American Political Science Association that have come about during our decade. It appears

¹Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, American Political Science: A Profile of a Discipline (New York: Atherton, 1964), p. 62.

likely that the APSA is, during the seventies, less representative of all political scientists than during the 1960's and years prior.

This is partially attributed to the impact of such organizations as the Caucus for a New Political Science and the American Society for Public Administration which appear to be laying claim to a number of persons who might previously have been affiliated with the APSA.

A recent study of perceptions of great men in the discipline, contrasted to a similar study by Somit and Tanenhaus made in 1963, made from membership roles, shows the APSA to be generally unaffected by the post-behavioral movement.¹

They found a "homogeneous learned discipline whose principal concern is with American political phenomena and whose preferred mode of inquiry is behavioral."² Thus the APSA as the new perceived organ of behavioral political science has become far more sectarian than in its previous years.

Additionally the APSA membership figures imply that it now involves a smaller percentage of political scientists than it did during the sixties. The number of regular members have increased by only 1,000 since 1969, despite the fact that some 5,000 new

¹Walter B. Roettger, "Strata and Stability: Reputations of American Political Scientists," PS 11 (1975). They attempted to duplicate the famous Somit and Tanenhaus survey of perceived great men. They found a reasonable agreement as to what scholars greatly contributed from 1945-1960, 1960-1970. Only two of those appearing in the top twelve were omitted in the previous survey. This bears witness to the triumph of behavioralism and the acceptance of quantitative techniques.

²Ibid., p. 10.

Ph.D.'s alone, have been awarded during the same span.¹

It is perhaps best at this time to point out the various limitations and problems involved in this study.

First, there is an impressionistic and interpretive element in my delineation of trends. These recognized trends can be documented at some length, but they cannot be proven beyond question. It must be kept in mind, because some would like us to forget, that we are dealing not with a single current, nor even with parallel currents, but with currents and crosscurrents. This is true both in methodologies and subfields as eclectic combinations are commonplace in such a diverse subject field.

As a body of writing, political science shades off gradually into what concerns other social sciences and the humanities as well. Therefore, there is not always a sharp distinction of scholars as distinctively political scientists. The diversity of political science is very great. A recent APSA survey found the number of content areas to be no fewer than twenty-seven.²

It is a reflection of my own optimism, no doubt also held by the many others who have attempted to reason out the development of political science in America, that I feel that these problems, although worthy of acknowledgement, are not destructive to this endeavor.

¹Information on APSA membership is taken from Evron Kirkpatrick, "Report of the Executive Director, 1974-75," PS 8 (1975): 298. Figures on the number of Ph.D's is taken from Thomas E. Mann, "Placement of Political Scientists in 1976," PS 9 (1976):412.

²H. Victor Wiseman, Politics: The Master Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), pp. 7-8.

In addition to the above problems a certain limitation must be mentioned. In tracing the developments in American political science I have confined my scope so as to exclude discussions of government and policy per se. I have thus tried to limit myself to political scientists and the variety of approaches they follow.

Another point to qualify is that philosophical traditions are at best only influential, I do not wish to convey the impression that they are highly deterministic or the only single cause for a particular development.

The movement of the naturalistic philosophies of pragmatism and positivism into the social sciences was a significant occurrence of the twentieth century. These traditions have claimed, in various ways, that the chief, if perhaps only, mode of knowledge is scientific and empirical. This led to a strong emphasis on observation and verification, a desire to employ the methodology of the natural and physical sciences, the idea of a unity among scientific disciplines, and in its extreme, the desire to avoid all moral and ethical considerations.

It will be seen that these assumptions contributed to substantive developments within the discipline of political science as practiced in America.

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL SCIENCE IN AMERICA: THE EARLY

YEARS: 1790-1900

Pre-Civil War Political Inquiry

The content of political science prior to the Civil War can be seen as lacking in scholarly treatises and monographs. It was more concerned with the conduct of statesmen and expressed this in citizen's literature. This literature, still important in modern analysis, included a category of the numerous state papers. These being the various constitutions, legal codes, and Supreme Court decisions. Also a part of this literature were political addresses, letters, journalisms, and editorials.

The main cause of the lack of an academic political science was that American higher education was not yet developed so as to support such specialization. Prior to the Civil War, in the colleges that did exist in America, political science scarcely existed as a subject. That which did, could be qualified generally as political ethics, since it was grounded in normative philosophical considerations.¹

This reflected the character of social thought, which up until that time, had been generally based on some form of deductive

¹Haddow, Political Science in American Colleges, pp. 130-35.

reasoning stressing natural law concepts. Political science was, thus, characterized by strong philosophical orientations. There was, at this time, no strong fact-value separation, as methods were often based on a priori acceptance of some ethical or moral principle. Since the Humean distinction had yet to find its way into the social disciplines, normative philosophical interests were prevalent

German Influences in American Political Science

The first academician to establish himself as a political scholar was Francis Lieber, a German immigrant, in the 1840's. Lieber's work reflected a strong philosophical-historical orientation in keeping with the methodology of that era.¹ When he took over the first chair in political science at Columbia in 1858, his inaugural speech reflected this disposition. In this address he defined politics to be the rational application of historical experience to moral problems of ordering priorities and defining interests in an ever-changing society.²

The last thirty years of the nineteenth century was a period when political science was established as an academic discipline in America. From the beginning, this involved the factoring out of political science departments from legal, historical, and philosophical studies.

A major curriculum development was in 1872 when Harvard moved to establish an elective system of undergraduate education.

¹Ibid., pp. 138-44. ²Ibid., p. 140.

Political studies, primarily a junior and senior course of study, was now offered to freshmen and sophomores.

The staff of the early political science departments set a pattern which lasted well into the next century. It was commonplace until 1900 that graduate matriculation of American academicians took place in Germany.¹ Late nineteenth century American political science, thus, often applied the concepts and frame of reference typical of German analysis.

German political science, during these years, was highly influenced by the presence of the state and its perceived importance. Staatstheorie accented the importance of the nation-state. As a method, it stressed sovereignty, national unity, and the development of the nation-state through history.

German staatstheorie presented a mechanical view of the sovereignty of the nation-state. It was idealistic in that reality was tied to an abstract ideal of the state as the agent of the citizens moral betterment.

What this philosophy fostered was an idea of the organic unity of the state and the presence of a common mind or national will. It was, thus, always subordinating individuals to groups and groups to the state.

Staatstheorie was also characterized by a dominance of historical-comparative methodology. Coupled with this were the

¹In 1904 half of the membership of the APSA had been educated in Europe and by 1914 this percentage was still one-third. Somit and Tanenhaus, The Development of American Political Science, p. 14.

elements that German academics had been noted for--emphasis on research and publication, training for the professorate, and a strong moral perspective based in German philosophy.

The Germans also possessed a methodology, staatwissenschaft, that stressed the need for objective inquiry and the development of models to aid in inquiry.

The strong German influence was prevalent in early American academic departments. Typical of the first generation of American political scientists trained in German methods were John Burgess and William Dunning at Columbia and Henry Baxter Adams at Johns Hopkins.

A major event in the establishment of American political science was the founding of the Columbia School of Political Science in 1880. This was under the leadership of John Burgess who modeled his departments after the methods and programs of their German counterparts, and stressed a historical-comparative analysis.

At this time new trends, based on American pragmatism and the philosophy of Herbert Spencer, began to take hold. Pragmatism would stress realism and become more involved with the observation and description of the actual workings of government.

It was obvious to many that, regardless of the extent of German training, staatstheorie, since it did not fit the American scene, could not last for long. With the decline in German training, and with the rise of pragmatism, its influence had been greatly reduced by the end of World War II.

CHAPTER III

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

The Establishment of a Professional Association

Of significance in the change between a political analysis saturated with ethical and legal formalisms was the development of pragmatism in America, and the rise of the progressive era that accompanied it.

It is important to understand, in gauging political science's development, what effect pragmatism had on the development of a scientific study of politics. The methods it fostered and their relation with the fact-value question are of central concern in understanding the influence of pragmatic thinking upon latter generations of scholars, and the meaning of pragmatism itself.

It was during these same years that political science established itself as a separate academic discipline.¹ It is of concern here to determine the influences which an academic professional group can bring to bear on a learned study, since the influences exerted by a professional association are numerous and if effectively applied, immense.

¹The number of practicing political scientists at the turn of the century are estimated to have numbered around 100. In fifty years the number of political scientists in America would reach 4,000. Leonard D. White, "Political Science at Mid-Century," Journal of Politics XII (February 1950):13-14.

The establishment of a separate association helped American political scientists with an initial identity crisis which had forced those seeking a professional convention to attend the meetings of the already established history and economic associations.¹

The fact of providing for an annual meeting was only a part of the influence exerted by a separate organization. More than ever, it is an indication that a learned discipline is independent of other similar areas of study by promoting work in that area, and by its support of autonomous department recognition.²

The establishment of a professional association begins by providing the structural features of a learned discipline--an official organization, officialdom, an official journal, and regularly prescribed meetings.

In many ways, through recognition in publication, participation at annual meetings, and movement into official positions, the association provides a form for advanced scholarship, research, and personal recognition. This in turn may act as a solid form of professional validation.

The influence and power of the association's officialdom can be of great influence. The officers and staff of a professional association not only initiate and recommend many policies, but,

¹American Historical Association (1884); American Economic Association (1885); American Psychology Association (1892); American Sociology Association (1903).

²As late as 1914, the "Haines Survey" of the APSA reported that out of 300 institutions only thirty-eight had entirely independent political science departments. Charles Haines, "Report of the Committee of Seven on Instruction in American Colleges and Universities," American Political Science Review IX (May 1915):355.

once approved, they also see to their implementation. They may, for example, take an active hand in setting editorial policy for the professional journal, or decide on the program content of the annual meeting. They may also arrange for the handling and training of internship programs, be responsible for the allocation of research funds of the discipline, and oversee those special research projects undertaken on behalf of the discipline.

Thus, the officialdom of a discipline should be viewed as especially important in setting the tone and standard of a profession through the influence they exert over the apparatus of the central office, professional journals, and association programs.

The officialdom of the American Political Science Association have been considered by many of its members to possess such powers, as a group, so as to be judged by its members to constitute a power position referred to as 'the establishment.'¹

In November, 1906, three years after the founding of the APSA in New Orleans, the American Political Science Review began its first volume.² By 1912 circulation of the Review had reached two hundred sixty-seven, a number which would double in twenty

¹Somit and Tanenhaus, American Political Science, p. 5. At the time of the survey 57% of those surveyed agreed that there was such a group with only 7% willing to reject the existence of an "establishment." For another discussion of this phenomena, see Alan Wolfe, "Practicing the Pluralism We Preach: Internal Processes in the American Political Science Association," Antioch Review XXXIX (Fall 1969):353-73.

²The American Political Science Review joined the already established journals, Political Science Quarterly (1885) and the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences (1891).

years.¹ In fifty years the Review would evolve into the most prestigious journal in the discipline.²

The Progressive Era and American
Pragmatism: The Realists

The initial establishment of American political science as a separate academic discipline at the turn of the century paralleled the political epoch known as the progressive era. Progressivism, with its main interest in reform and practical politics, provided fertile ground for the political methodology of realism or "hyperfactualism" as it was later termed.³ Its necessity for actual political involvement was not conducive, either to the speculative idealist philosophy of the Germans, nor the rigid Austinian jurisprudence of the English, and thus added to their decline.

It was during the progressive era that pragmatism became the dominant social philosophy in America. Pragmatism, often considered as America's greatest single contribution to philosophy, was developed in the philosophical writings of Charles Pierce, William James and later John Dewey. It is accepted as the major philosophical foundation of the progressive era.⁴ Pragmatism may be described as

¹Haddow, Political Science in American Colleges, p. 261.

²In a 1964 Somit and Tanenhaus survey the American Political Science Review was given a wide margin in prestige over all other political science journals; see Somit and Tanenhaus, American Political Science, p. 90.

³The use of the term "hyperfactualism" as a reference to the "realist" is developed by David Easton; see David Easton, The Political System (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1953), pp. 66-78.

⁴Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), p. 103.

a logical outgrowth of the lessons learned from Darwinian evolution; first as it applies to the work of Darwin, and then as a perspective to be applied to all social phenomena. Pragmatists, contrary to the fixed notions of state and legal structures, viewed society as progressive. This was a process of endless change, without any fixed ends. Thus pragmatism, also known as instrumentalism, aimed at solving practical problems through the use of factual research: not the framing of theories or the eludiations of metaphysics.

The pragmatists were, therefore, less interested in absolute principles and ultimate truths. The method was scientific, in that it was empirical and experimental. Its basis for evaluation lay in the institution's ability to provide results. Moral principles were seen as unfixed, since cultural and social conditions determined truths. Thus their ethical theory was evolutionary and therefore relative to the historical setting.

The older philosophies had generally subordinated the individual to institutions and made the nation-state the agency of development; pragmatism, on the other hand, viewed society as pluralistic. It was seen as a composition of a variety of associations of which the state was but one. Its main purpose: to mediate the activities of the numerous groups.

Pragmatism's effect upon the study of politics was to foster the efforts of the new realists. American political science, thus moved away from a state and juridical orientation, toward the examination of actual political processes and the political behavior and motivations behind men and groups. The older orientations were

seen as invisible and intangible, while the new method concentrated on the very real. They, the new realists, looked to the concreteness of legislative, executive, and judicial institutions; examining the character of their actions and the facts of their existence. Thus, the pragmatic revolt against formalism helped to shift political method from a mechanical to an evolutionary model based on empirical data.

The American political science establishment, from its beginnings and continuing until the 1920's, was dominated by an officialdom, which followed, if not founded, the new school of realism. The early association reflect the philosophy of pragmatism and the reformism of the progressive era.

The motives of the new school were mixed, but possessed:

1. A desire for an independent political science
2. A fascination with actual political activity
3. A desire to reform political life

Until the 1920's when the progressive era waned, the realists were highly influential in political science and could claim a number of its practitioners as APSA presidents. These include such notable pragmatic-realists as Frank Goodnow; James Bruce, himself English; A. Lawrence Lowell; Woodrow Wilson; Albert Busnell Hart; Jesse Macy; and Henry James Ford.¹

Of importance to the understanding of the succession of methods in American political science is the manner of similarities

¹Martin Landau, Political Science and Political Theory (New York: Macmillan, 1972), p. 65.

and differences between these early leaders and latter behavioral political scientists. Were these realists close forerunners to the behavioral movement, or were the methods and epistemology of this second generation too incisively different to be closely linked to later empirical methods?

Perhaps the greatest difference was in the lack of any general theoretical framework or causal theory in early realism.

About this period, Martin Landau, writes:

It did not connote the rigor which comes to mind today, nor was it directed toward formal theoretical systems. On the contrary, the deductive method was frowned upon and a reliance on axiomatic nets was held to be the prime defect of the general systems builder.¹

Bernard Crick, in regards to this period, reached the same conclusion that:

the fact is that none of the pragmatists really thought systematically about scientific procedure. They thought of science in a cant manner, as a method of observation, experimentation, and then theory. The prior importance of theory to observation scarcely occurred to them. To the pragmatists a prior commitment would seem like a prejudice. The task of the social philosopher would be to let the facts bring themselves to order.²

David Easton, in his attempt to point out the shortcomings of the early realists, coined the term hyperfactualism in reference to what he saw as "a method of random collections of factual researches each of which stands alone and suffers from a theoretical malnutrition and surfeit of facts."³

¹Ibid., p. 19.

²Crick, The American Science of Politics, pp. 92-93.

³Easton, The Political System, pp. 66-78.

This is not to say that there were not at this time any political scientists who were applying methods which would prove more popular at a later time. Arthur F. Bentley has been identified as a watershed figure and a forerunner of later methods. In his writing it is felt that he came "to synthesize the thought of the social sciences in the progressive era in his Process of Government (1908),¹ and was to anticipate the transition from pragmatism to the positivism of the twenties and the thirties."²

Bentley's departure from pragmatic writing is seen in his positivistic call for students of politics to engage exclusively in empirical research. This would therefore require that the fluid and provisional logic of pragmatism be changed to a closed static system of equilibrium.

Bentley is also seen as demonstrating a causal theory in his formulation of groups as the only determinant of political interests. To him, everything that mattered in social and economic policy fit into a model of conflicting group pressures.³ A reading of Bentley and the latter work of David Truman,⁴ proves this to be true, as he,

¹Arthur Bentley, The Process of Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908).

²Crick, The American Science of Politics, p. 92.

³Myron Q. Hale, "The Cosmology of Arthur Fisher Bentley," American Political Science Review LIV (December 1960):958. Also on Bentley's exclusive reliance on groups; see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 120.

⁴David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1951).

in his simplistic reliance on groups, displayed on early theoretical formulation, highly different than that of his contemporaries.

About this period, a final point must be made concerning the value orientation of the early realists in comparison to that which was to follow. Pragmatists, although regarding values as changing, did not approach total value neutrality or value relativity like the scientific methodologies which followed. Pragmatic epistemology was characterized by a final joining of fact and value. It did claim the sanction of empirical science, but it took the position that value could indeed be validated in and for human experiences.

In viewing the method and epistemology of pragmatism and the methodology of the early realists, Bernard Crick, found pragmatism responsible for the rigid empiricism developed in later years. This, I believe, is a misreading of the pragmatic philosophy. As we shall see more clearly in comparison with positivism, pragmatism was neither totally devoid of value orientation, nor as developed in quantitative methods and empirical theories, as to be considered a founding method. If latter day methods developed to be too rigidly empirical, it was in spite of the pragmatic influence not because of it.

The intellectual origins of behavioralism are varied and include the evolutionary mood of the post-Darwinian period, positivism, utilitarianism, naturalism, and the general intense interest in science that permeated intellectual thought in the early twentieth century. There is no denying that pragmatism did provide an intellectual cornerstone of behavioralism. It appears,

however, that early behavioralism, upon the attainment of acceptability, became so a-historical and a-philosophical, that it rejected its pragmatic origins as it became increasingly more absorbed and refined in empirical analysis. Behavioralism, as we shall see, honored the empirical-evolutionary anti-scholastic tradition of pragmatism, but little else of that diverse tradition survived. Concepts once introduced on an instrumental basis were transformed into definitive guideposts as positivism replaced pragmatism.

CHAPTER IV

THE NEW INFLUENCE OF NATURALISTIC PHILOSOPHIES

Positivism vs. Historicism

Bernard Crick, in appraising the rise of pragmatism states: "by the early twenties there was scarcely a social scientist who did not consider himself to be somewhat of a pragmatist." He speaks of the important changes that were to take place beginning at this time in noting that, "by the end of the twenties the old pragmatic reformist spirit amongst political scientists was largely dead."¹

What is revealed through Crick's perceptions is that the twenties were watershed years--as a period of large and important changes in the epistemological orientation and the scope and method of political science. Pragmatism, grounded in history and philosophy, would, during these years, give way to the rising neo-positivist epistemology more closely related to that of the natural sciences. The input of positivism would in turn have an immense effect upon the study of politics in America.

By neo-positivism I am referring to the logical positivism of the "Vienna Circle" and those methodologies which accept its orientations. Neo-positivism should be viewed as markedly more

¹Crick, The American Science of Politics, p. 175.

sophisticated than either the sociocratic Comtean positivism or the militant religious scientism of the earlier philosophy of Saint Simon. This is due to its conscious efforts to avoid the overt claim of values as science presented in these earlier forms of positivism.

Positivism is more easily understood if contrasted with its chief rival theory of knowledge. Positivism, with its major accent on objective knowledge, stands in strong opposition to all relativistic theories of knowledge. These positions come under the names of perspectivism, subjectivism, relativism, instrumentalism, and the most widely used idiom, historicism.¹

Historicism asserts that all human knowledge is relative to its particular time and place.² It denies the possibility of the direct objective awareness of sense data in a pure state.

Historicism, instead, asserts, in different respect, that data is structured by a priori principles, historical settings, or categories of the mind. Historicists then, in some form, recognize a relativity to truth. Historicism in moderation can accept science as sufficient in explaining physical data, but is inadequate for understanding manifestations of human life.

¹David Easton assumes this position in finding the reason for the lack of empirical theory in the influence of historicist forms of philosophy; see Easton, The Political System, chap. i.

²For a discussion of the history of this term, along with a useful bibliography; see Maurice Mandelbaum, "Historicism," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1967), IV:22-25.

The historicist perspective possesses a long intellectual lineage and can be identified with many past and contemporary philosophies, including pragmatism.¹

Logical positivism was a term coined to characterize the standpoint of a group of philosophers, scientists, and mathematicians who had given themselves the name the Vienna Circle.² Its reference has generally gone beyond the actual University of Vienna contingent to include the closely related works of Russell, Whitehead, G. E. Moore, and Wittgenstein; in addition to Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath and Herbert Feigl, a few of the more famous Vienna group.

Positivism looked to the general development of a unity of science movement and the related treatment of philosophy as an analytical rather than as a speculative endeavor. All complex and significant propositions, it was asserted, could be constructed out of logical operations from a base language for truth or falsehood.

Logical positivism was also a movement to emulate the natural sciences. The Vienna Circle believed that scientists of different disciplines should collaborate more with each other. This flowed

¹Bertrand Russell has an essay pointing out the relativist aspects of John Dewey's pragmatism by its use of belief and culture as foundations of truth; see Bertrand Russell, "Pragmatism," in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Paul Arthur Schilp (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1939), pp. 35-53.

²A discussion of the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle is provided by the editor in the "Introduction" to Logical Positivism, ed. A. J. Ayer (New York: Free Press, 1959), pp. 3-28. Included in this text are selections from Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Bertrand Russell, and Carl Hempel.

from the belief that "there is no essential difference in aims or methods amongst the various branches of science."¹

Within this unity of science approach was the belief that there was no difference between the natural and social sciences. A. J. Ayers in addressing this point says:

The Vienna Circle rejected the view, which many still hold, that there is a radical distinction between the natural and the social sciences. The scale and diversity of the phenomena with which the social sciences dealt with made them less successful in establishing scientific laws, but this was a difficulty of practice, not of principal.² They too were concerned in the end with physical events.

What positivism voiced in its strongest position was a respect for scientific method, a rejection of metaphysics, and an approach to all true knowledge as empirically or logically attainable.

Positivism, thus, sets itself in opposition to historicist's philosophies; evident in its acceptance of empirical truth and rejection of metaphysics. Empirical knowledge is positivism's acceptance of objective sense-data independent of time, space, or cognition, contrary to historicism.

The rejection of metaphysics dates back to the rigid empiricism of David Hume, and also to Kant. Kant, however, rejected metaphysical truth, for entirely different reasons, since he maintained that human understanding was lost in contradiction when it ventured beyond the bounds of possible experience.

The originality of logical positivism, thus, lay in their making the impossibility of metaphysics depend, not upon the nature of what could be known, but of what could be truthfully said. Their

¹Ibid., p. 21. ²Ibid.

charge against metaphysics was that it did not qualify as truth since it had no relationship to empirical fact. It was, therefore, as far as truth goes, meaningless.

This was not to say that metaphysics is not important, but that compared to scientific argument, it lacked objective, verifiable knowledge. Ethics, it was argued, was a psychological emotive response of personal likes or dislikes.¹ Its position for examination would therefore employ scientific psychological analysis to find out for what reasons such a position is held. The metaphysician would not be treated as a criminal but more as a patient.

Positivism in its widest sense is seen as embracing all shades of analytical, linguistic, or radically empirical philosophy. Positivism thus sets itself in opposition to all forms of historicism.

While philosophy was experiencing this new orientation, at the same time, positivism began to establish itself within the various social sciences with new vigor unlike any similar but earlier empirical method. This was evidenced during the 1920's with the appearance of such related developments as the social science movement; the human behavior orientation; and different calls for scientific-empirical studies. What would follow in later years would be the use of empirical theory and the theoretical behavioralism of post World War II, American political science. Although positivism failed to make a clean sweep, the positivization of the social sciences had begun.

¹Ibid., p. 73.

Early Designs for a Scientific Political
Science: Behaviorism

Political Science, like the other social sciences, did in the 1920's experience the rise of the positivist perspective and reflected it in a variety of related development which would in time provide immense change for the scope and methods of political study. This was most evident in American political science in the movements toward a scientific study of politics based on the methodology of the natural sciences; the social science orientation; and the initial generation of non-theoretical, behavioral political science.¹

All of these movements are reflected in and typified by the early promotions of Charles Edward Merriam. Merriam was a dominant figure in all three of these developments.

In 1921, Merriam, using the American Political Science Review as a forum, launched into his promotion of a more scientific study of politics. His essay, "On the Present State of Study of Politics"² led to the creation within the Association of the

¹"By scientism we mean the belief that the methodology generally associated with the natural sciences can be fruitfully used to attack problems of fundamental concern to a given discipline. The belief rests in turn on a cluster of value commitments, the most central of which is the belief that regular laws can be developed which have explanatory and predictive utility. Among other values associated with scientism are a) the necessity of avoiding confusion between facts on one hand and values on the other; b) the necessity of maintaining a close and continuous interrelationship between data and theory; and c) the need to use the utmost precision in collecting and analyzing data." Somit and Tanenhaus, The Development of American Political Science, pp. 27-28.

²Charles Merriam, "On the Present State of the Study of Politics," American Political Science Review XV (May 1921):173-85.

Committee on Political Research with Merriam as its chairman.¹ As part of this development three "National Conferences on a Science of Politics" were held from 1923 to 1925 with Merriam's influence a major factor.²

Merriam was at the same time taking a lead in the promotion of a scientific social science movement outside of the Association. In 1923, with Charles Merriam as its first chairman, the Social Science Research Council was established. Its aim was toward the promotion of scientific research in economics, history, sociology, psychology, anthropology, and statistics by the raising and administering of financial aid. The SSRC would in the coming years become the greatest single clearinghouse of patronage for the social sciences--liberally aided during these early years by the philanthropy of the Rockefeller Foundation.³

The philosophy of positivism was highly apparent in the early scientific behavioralism and social science movement. What was proposed and discussed at this stage of development was a firm design

¹Charles Merriam, "Progress Report of the Committee on Political Research," American Political Science Review XVII (May 1923): 274-312.

²A. B. Hall et al., "Report of the Conference on a Science of Politics," American Political Science Review XVIII (February 1924): 119-26; A. B. Hall et al., "Reports of the Second National Conference on a Science of Politics," American Political Science Review XIX (January 1925):104-62; A. B. Hall et al., "Reports of the Conference on a Science of Politics," American Political Science Review XX (February 1926):124-71.

³Crick, The American Science of Politics, p. 137.

to use science as a model by which political science would become more empirical and objective in the manners of the natural sciences, while moving away from historical and philosophical orientations.¹

It was felt that complete description could be obtained by gauging human behavior, not by speculation or any exegesis of texts. Human behavior, expressed through focuses on power, motivation, and groups, reflected the rising prominence of psychology, as a developing science. Thus it was advanced that research in political behavior must be directed to discover the attitudes and motivations of individuals and groups so as to discover the effects of such factors as personality on political situations.

What was joined to this focus was the use of statistical techniques as a prime method of analysis and verification. Therefore, the human behavior focus employed the use and refinement of surveys, interviews, attitudinal measurement, and scale constructions.² Merriam, time and again, stressed the need to apply psychological orientations and statistical techniques in order to expand the scope of the discipline.³

¹"Political Science, to become a science should first of all obtain a decree of divorce from the philosophers, lawyers, and psychologists with whom it has been in the status of a polygamous companionate marriage to the detriment of its own quest for truth." William Munroe, "Physics and Politics--An Old Analogy Revisited," American Political Science Review XXIV (February 1928):8.

²The first manual for statistical techniques in political research was by Stuart Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics (New York: F. S. Crofts, 1928).

³Charles Merriam, New Aspects of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925).

Merriam is perhaps best recognized in his chairmanship over the political science department at the University of Chicago which was highly influential in the creation of a second generation of behavioral political scientists.

Nowhere was the new science of politics, with its unique focus on power and groups, more ardently studied than at Chicago. Under Merriam's tireless leadership a host of scholars committed to this new method was assembled. Such notables as Leonard White, Harold Gosnell, Quincy Wright, Fredrick Shuman, Roscoe Martin, V. O. Key, Gabriel Almond, Avery Leiserson, C. Herman Prichett, Herbert Simon, and David Truman were part of the famed Chicago School of the 1930's. Perhaps the most famous behavioralist to span both generations, Harold Laswell, was from the earliest days part of this group.

Merriam, through the institutional structures which he helped set up and the scholars he influenced, showed a change from historical progressivism to psychological behavioralism, which paralleled a large number of the profession as well.

The difference between early forms of behavioralism and later developments is of interest. Early behavioralism advocated the use of scientific method, a more systematic use of quantitative data, and the desire for unity among the social science disciplines, but lacked a central feature which did not develop. Although it was a new method and possessed the positivist view of knowledge it produced no non-substantive theory. The reason being that non-substantive political scientists--notably political theorists--did not join in this movement. Behavioralism's theoretical breakthrough did not

emerge until after World War II. It may be argued, however, that the interest in psychological theory and content analysis by Laswell, in his early years, does bridge the gap, as did Arthur Bentley, between generations.

The 1930's and early 40's are considered as a period of quiescence for the scientific and behavioral growth in American political science. Normative and historical methods experienced a slow rise to prominence, perhaps due to the influence of European emigres, still strong in philosophical orientation.

Within the association, behavioralism made no strong gains in establishing itself within the officialdom during these years. The presidency of the American Political Science Association furnishes in this respect a convenient symbol of change. From 1927, when Merriam was elected president, until 1950, none of the presidents were prominently identified as advocates of the behavioral approach. The election of Peter Odegard in 1950 might be regarded as a turning point.¹

Behavioralism during these years was by no means dormant. A myriad of quantitative studies and techniques were advanced. Also important was the influx of quantitative scholars from Europe into neighboring disciplines. A point previously made is that political science was greatly influenced by the effects of positivistic philosophy and quantitative techniques in the other social sciences.

¹Robert Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science, Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest," American Political Science Review LV (December 1961):766.

This continued to apply, and even to a greater extent as "behavioral schools" developed in disciplines with subject matter that had always been part of political science.¹

Internally American political science would most directly be changed by the movements of the second generation of behavioral scholars with the important influence of empirical and causal theories as a major new framework of analysis. Behavioralism would gain new prominence and itself undergo a character change through movements toward positivist methodological hegemony amongst its major advocates.

¹"The field of political sociology, defined as an effort to apply various concepts and methods of sociology to the study of political behavior and institutions suddenly emerged as a major enterprise. Its practitioners not only sought to explain voting behavior, but they also applied the analysis of bureaucratic structures developed in the work of Max Weber and Robert Michels to a variety of institutional studies ranging from government agencies to trade unions, political parties and economic institutions. Economics also returned to an interest in political economy, seeing in the individual policy makers to make repetitive choices a further substantive area with which to elaborate their increasingly rigorous mathematical and statistical models. The political movements of the issues which dominated the thirties and forties, particularly the growth of totalitarian political movements, pressed other social scientists in psychology and anthropology to apply their concepts and methods analyzing the sources of various forms of politically relevant phenomena." Seymour M. Lipset, ed., Politics and the Social Sciences (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. xi.

CHAPTER V

THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMPIRICAL DEMOCRATIC THEORY

Democracy as an Economic System: Joseph Shumpeter

The most immediate American manifestation of the changes in methodology invoked by the rise of positivism was the introduction of so-called empirical democratic theory and its attempted preemption of normative theories of democracy.

If the rise of democratic revisionism, first evidenced in the writing of Joseph Shumpeter in the early 1940's,¹ was impressive it is because of the methodological motivating and structuring forces which lead to its definition, development, and acceptance. The epistemological assumptions of positivism provided the basis by which normative democratic theory was rejected, and gave further validity to the empirical knowledge from which a new view of democracy could be legitimated. Political science did not manufacture these assumptions about epistemology and permissible concepts, but rather developed them from the major intellectual climate of the time--specifically, philosophy and the philosophy of science.

¹Joseph Shumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1942).

The development of empirical democratic theory demonstrates how scientism is both procedural and substantive. It is procedural in that it identified scientific method as the way to gather facts. More importantly it is also substantive in that it could identify these facts, as not just data, but what should exclusively count. Positivism demanded that modern democratic theory must be empirically descriptive in form and focused on present political organization.

In the case of democratic theory, positivistic methodology confronted a state of affairs which contradicted a long held set of ideas. Like the natural scientist who upon uncovering evidence that refutes an accepted theory and reforms that theory, the new political scientist operating within the confines of an identical world did precisely the same. It was felt that if democratic principles were to be viable they would have to be reinterpreted in order to conform to verifiable reality.

It is incomplete, according to my position, to judge democratic revisionism as merely a conservative ideological response. The new democratic theory did conform to conservative values. This is strongly evident in its desire for stability, fears of equality, acceptance of apathy, and positive role given to limited voter participation. Early nineteenth century theorists had taken this same value position. De Toqueville had argued that the common culture of egalitarianism and mass participation would subvert democracy. His position, however, was arrived at through a classical historical analysis, referred to as "verstehen."

The uniqueness of democratic revision is that it arrived at these same conclusions by a different route. Empirical facts, as the substance of reality, created an empirically grounded theory. While normative theory could be rejected as based on values and empirically non-verifiable, and thus meaningless conditions. It was, therefore, methodological commitments which formed the mode of operations, and also provided the conclusions for a new legitimacy to old ideas through the joining of empirical facts with positivistic epistemology.

Shumpeter, setting the pace for those who followed, saw normative democracy as non-existent. It was rejected, not out of value disagreement, but because it was viewed as empirically unreal and value-laden. For these reasons, Shumpeter tagged normative doctrine as antiquated and illusionary. The product of an eighteenth century world view of rationalism. In keeping with this perspective, normative democratic theory was referred to as "classical," lacking the same footing as empirical facts. His definition of "classical democracy" states:

that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are assembled to carry out its will.¹

Contrary to this, however, the facts arrived at in the numerous empirical studies of the previous decade had found that populations were disorganized, apathetic, and uneducated in democratic procedures. The historical events of that day notably the collapse

¹Ibid., p. 250.

of the Weimar Republic and the success of totalitarian governments further strengthen this view of undemocratic mass culture and the need for stability.

The positivist political and social scientists, as chief proponents of empirical democratic theory accepted these contradictions as the given state of affairs. From this, they were able to fashion a theory of democracy that desired limited participation and defined democracy as a procedure of competition amongst elites and groups for votes. Shumpeter's "modern" concept of democracy defined it as:

that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote.¹

Democracy was thus limited to the voting booth. Schumpeter, himself, did not see civil rights as a contemporary developmental issue, and thought property and religious qualifications as compatible with a democratic society.²

The 1950's would bring a new generation of empirical theorists who, with the addition of causal theory as a framework of analysis, would continue to accept the new view of democracy influenced by a positivistic orientation to the philosophy of knowledge. Democracy would be viewed as a theory unassociated with any particular ideals or ends.

¹Ibid., p. 269.

²Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 5.

CHAPTER VI

POSTWAR POLITICAL SCIENCE

The Desire for Causal Theories

Since the separation of fact from value, by far the great schism in the philosophy of knowledge, had been made in the 1920's and 1930's, the social sciences were prepared for even greater innovation in the years following World War II. In American political science the postwar years are generally characterized as "the behavioral revolution." The use of the term revolution accents the great changes brought upon the study of politics by the advocates of an increasingly scientific behavioralism.

The wartime contributions of the other social sciences, new developments in survey and research techniques, the substitution of a positivistic epistemology for pragmatism, the success of behavioralism in attaining professional association leadership, and increased foundation and governmental support, all contributed to the intensity and success of postwar behavioralism.

The specter of totalitarianism and the failures democracy had during the war years pressed social scientists from other disciplines into applying psychology and anthropology in analyzing various political phenomena. The lack of a theoretical tradition of moral and ethical theory amongst these disciplines had no doubt

hastened their movement into non-normative methodologies, and explains to some extent, why political science, with a strong philosophical tradition, was so resistant to the behavioral impetus.

The postwar period witnessed important new work by political scientists. To a considerable extent these changes reflected the absorption of the theoretical and methodological approaches of economics, political sociology, biology, and anthropology. Economics, with its already well-established idea of equilibrium, provided a model of a social science that possessed a methodology similar to the methods of a natural science. The extent to which political scientists would borrow from economic theory in the following years was immense.¹

Earlier behavioralists had laid the groundwork for the innovations of the postwar generation. They had rejected institutions as the basic unit of research and in its place substituted individuals and groups.

Thus the focus was no longer upon laws, constitutions, or formal organizations of government, as such, but upon the study of human behavior. The traditional behavioralists had also established the importance of the unity of science movement and the push for a social science. In addition, traditional behavioralists had advocated the utilization of more precise techniques

¹"Political Economics is in principal independent of any ethical or normative judgements." Milton Friedman, ed., Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 42.

of observing, measuring, and classifying data so as to promote the use of statistical formula whenever possible.

Traditional behaviorists had, therefore, laid the foundation for American political science to move into a more positivistic and less pragmatic orientation. The postwar generation, however, with its attempt to promote a greater unity of the science movement than the more pragmatic behaviorists had ever dreamed of, shifted the emphasis of developing scientific logic from factual and multi-disciplinary approaches towards the construction of general theoretical frameworks.

It is this final shift into an empirical theoretical framework that marks the change between pre and postwar behaviorists. The prime movers in the second generation of behaviorists were theoretical innovators. The writings of Harold Laswell, Robert Dahl, David Easton, David Truman, Gabriel Almond, and others stressed the need to formulate a general conceptual framework for analysis based upon various scientific modes of verification and analysis.

The development of empirical democratic theory, the systems approach, decision-making, and communications theories, led to new applications within all the subfields of political science. These approaches were contained within the assumption that the goal of political science is the construction of systematic empirical research. What this means is that the required search for uniformities in human behavior must rest upon an explicit statement of hypotheses to be tested and assumptions made, and furthermore, that the testing of propositions shall be through careful

adhering to empirical evidence in a fashion which enables validation by successive research efforts.

The orientation towards the systematic development of generalizations imposes two requirements. First, major reliance must be placed upon empirical data; and secondly, that this emphasis on the empirical requires a departure from normative research and moral and ethical theory. Because of this, the political theory developed by postwar behavioralists was largely descriptive or causal. It often took the form of model construction, explanation of the refining of hypotheses, and the drawing out of the implications of concepts from neighboring areas of study. This is consistent with the principle that theoretical activity must be performed within the realm of science and not philosophy.¹

In addition to the earlier focuses of power and groups, there developed new focuses on decision-making, political participation, status and role, community elites and symbols, communication, and comparativeness.

The Argument for an Exclusively Scientific Political Science

Because of the requirement for a systematic, empirical, political science, latter behavioralism has both its methodological heroes and its methods non grata. It accepts as admissible only information that is inductive, quantifiable, and empirically verifiable, while

¹"They should leave ethics to the philosopher and concern themselves with political behavior." William Whyte, "A Challenge to Political Science," American Political Science Review XXVII (March 1943):695.

rejecting as unsubstantiated, subjective, or even worthless propositions advanced on any other foundation.

The theoretical innovators of the second generation of behavioralists are indicative of these developments. Upon the attainment of legitimacy, it became possible for behavioralists to attempt to exclude approaches from the discipline of political science that were not basically empirical. It appears that in the next two decades there were occasional claims for undogmatic openness advanced by more pragmatic behavioralists, but amongst more ardent supporters there developed a variety of arguments for the exclusive legitimacy of empirical based approaches and methods. These arguments, we shall see, were based upon either a scientific fact-value dichotomy, the desire for causal frameworks of analysis, and, by the mid-sixties, the use of an idea of the non-cumulative maturation of scientific disciplines, adopted from the writings of Thomas Kuhn.

The overall effect of these factors caused latter-day behaviorism to be a-historical and a-philosophical, if not outright anti-historical and anti-philosophical. As a consequence behaviorism, by eschewing history and philosophy, had forgotten the full meaning of its pragmatic origins, and became instead totally absorbed in a scientific-empirical political analysis.

An examination of the writings and pronouncements of representative behavioralists will demonstrate the development of a dogmatic, empirically exclusive method during these years.

Behavioralism was not merely a conservative response to the study

of political science, but more so in its extreme, the uncritical acceptance of scientific method as a higher order of knowledge.

It was through the design to reevaluate the history of political science methodologies that an attempt was made to limit the status of non-scientific methodologies. The idea of a revolutionary leap and a cleavage with past methods under the desire for a mature scientific discipline necessarily makes alternative methods seem outmoded.

Was there a cleavage? Did political science reject its past? This historical interpretation becomes the cornerstone of an argument for a higher-status to scientific political analysis.

The Effects of Scientific Aspirations on Key Professional Institutions

The rapid growth of the behavioral movement during the 50's and 60's was highly dependent upon aid received from foundations, governmental and university sources, and its ability to capture key power positions within the American Political Science Association. The late 1940's saw a large increase in foundation support by the joining of established Rockefeller Foundation support with increased monies from the Ford and Carnegie Foundations. The Ford Foundation would, during the postwar years, become the the leading contributor to behavioral research by its expenditures of vast sums into its Behavioral Science Program.¹

¹"If the foundations had been hostile to the behavioral approach it would of been rough sledding indeed." Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach," p. 765.

The 1940's also heralded the establishment of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan and the recognition in 1945 by the National Science Foundation that political science was a behavioral science.

The effects of the already established Social Science Research Council would continue to mount. According to Robert Dahl, the SSRC had "an unostentatious but cumulatively enormous impact upon American social science."¹

The SSRC's committees dealing with political analysis, the Committee on Political Behavior (1948-1963), and its successor entity the Committee on Governmental and Legal Processes have been generally credited for greatly influencing American Political Science.² The design of these committees are expressed by David Truman, a committee chairman, as were many Association presidents, when he writes that the origins of the committee:

lay in dissatisfaction with a political science that was intellectually fragmented and for the most part unequipped to look beyond official formalism and anecdotal, journalistic endeavors. It was a political science unready to address the large (or small, but strategically significant) questions concerning politics and political orders--the persistent questions of authority and the distribution of power, of change and stability, of super and subordination, of succession and accountability--with modern techniques

¹Ibid., p. 764.

²"The Committee on Political Behavior has been an active stimulant in the growth of the behavioral approach down to the present time, indeed, in recent years (under the chairmanship of David Truman) the committee has also awarded research grants." Ibid.

and with a language capable of ordering pertinent empirical data in terms useful for dealing with contemporary moral, and prescriptive issues of political life.¹

Given this definition of the problem the objectives were "to advance a systematic science of politics that would be both incisive and useful."²

In his review of the reports from the Committee on Political Behavior, Albert Somit concluded:

that in one sense their reports lend support to friend and foe alike, for they explicitly affirm the Committee's deliberately sought to accomplish and were quite successful in achieving a significant re-orientation of post-1945 American political science.³

Truman concludes his assessment of the key stewardship of the SSRC and its political committees with these comments:

Two observations nevertheless seem justified by the record. First, the Committee significantly contributed to the reconception of the discipline of political science, so that however controversial its efforts and the activities of those who followed its lead, the study of politics received a stronger and more systematic position amongst the social sciences. Second, the accomplishments of the Committee are the example of a wise foundation strategy. For an average annual expenditure of less than \$70,000 the Carnegie Corporation and the Ford Foundation over a period of fifteen years made possible the restructuring of a major discipline.⁴

¹David Truman, "The Impact of Political Science on the Revolution in the Social Sciences," in Research Frontiers in Politics and Government, ed. Stephen K. Bailey (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1955), pp. 1-2.

²Ibid., p. 3.

³Albert Somit, "Reports of Two Key SSRC Committees: Back to the Drafting Board," PS VIII (Winter 1975):6.

⁴Truman, "The Impact of Political Science," p. 7.

Yet another institutional factor encouraging the success of behavioralism in American political science was its ability, beginning in the early fifties, to place its advocates in key positions in the American Political Science Association. A majority of those elected to Association leadership were, in the next two decades, either spokesmen for exclusively scientific politics or closely sympathetic to the behavioral persuasion. It is those who were more prone to narrow the discipline that I will focus on.

This is of interest since, with their arrival into high office, a political science with a positivistic cast was able to exercise a decisive voice in all of the professional groups powers--in granting allocations from government and foundations, and in publications and meetings.

The specific nature of the Association during the 50's and 60's aided in the effect of a competitive advantage to those with control. The Association was during these years internally oligarchical and considerably undemocratic. Association officers were, during these years, selected by a single nominating committee. Included within the nomination was election--until the late 1960's the committee's choices were never contested.¹

¹"In the period 1958-1967, one hundred and forty-nine contests for APSA officers occurred, ten for president, thirty for vice-president, ten for secretary, ten for treasurer, and eighty-nine for council. Not a single one was contested at the business meeting." ... "not a single nomination was contested from the floor." Wolfe, *Practicing the Pluralism*, p. 364.

The powers of the executive committee are decisive. Besides great influence over a professional association, it chooses an editor for the journal, appoints program and selects chairmen for the annual meeting who in turn arrange for papers to be presented.

In surveying the Association presidents during these years, it is evidenced that a number of the most ardent supporters of an exclusive political science occupied this position. The thoughts which they expressed both in their presidential addresses and personal writings confirm their attempt to, in various ways, establish an exclusively scientific-empirical political science at the expense of the legitimacy of other methods.

CHAPTER VII

THE RISE OF BEHAVIORALISM WITHIN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION: 1950-1970

Behavioralism Becomes a Major Approach

The election of Peter Odegard as president of the American Political Science Association marked the beginning of the shift toward those sympathetic to contemporary behavioralism. Odegard and his immediate successor, Pendleton Herring, although highly supportive of behavioralism, did not advance it as the single correct method of political study.

This non-dogmatic behavioralism is present in many behavioralists as in eclectic fashion they choose to make room for other methods or incorporated normative political positions into their own behavioral orientation.

The next three presidents, James Pollack, Ralph Bunche, and Charles McKinley, could not be considered behavioralists. Pollack and McKinley pressed institutional and constitutional analysis. Ralph Bunche stands as a rarity since the election of a non-academic to the Association leadership is an exception in an organization dominated by academics.¹

¹The lack of a representative number of non-academic political scientists in APSA leadership from 1946-1975 has been verified by Allan Schick, "Political Science Isn't as Political Science Does," PS IX (Summer 1976):276-78.

It was with the election of Harold Laswell in 1955 that political science experienced a major figure in the empirical-social science movement. There is in fact no one person who exceeds him in the intensity of applying various kinds of scientific approaches.

Bernard Crick wrote of Laswell's great influence:

he is the acknowledged master of the specifically scientific school of politics and has probably influenced more work in other people than any political scientist.¹

Harold Laswell

Harold Laswell is truly one of the major figures in American political science. His career spans the beginnings of behavioralism, under Charles Merriam at Chicago, to the influence and respect his presence receives at present. It is perhaps, in part, due to the longevity of his career that Laswell moved through two phases and a variety of political approaches. The first phase, prior to the end of World War II, was that of a desire for a scientific value free political science. Laswell, however, was greatly influenced by the events of the war and after it decided that political science must aid in the perpetuation of democratic societies. It is from this commitment that he moved to advance political science as a policy science.

Throughout his entire career Laswell stressed the need to advance an empirical-scientific approach over that of philosophical

¹Crick, The American Science of Politics, p. 176.

or historical analysis. His foci over these years stressed power, personality, and language.¹

Psychopathology and Politics reflected the perception of looking at politics in terms of personality structure. This form of analysis was significant of the early attempt to approach political activities with a psychologically therapeutic aim, rather than a historical-comparative analysis. Laswell's application of Freudian categories also helped to direct attention to neighboring disciplines in order to discover motivations behind political behavior.

Laswell's movement into semantics was a recognized reflection of similar philosophical work being performed by logical positivists. Professor G. G. Catlin, author of the early work Science and Politics, remarked of Laswell:

At Chicago and Yale, Professor H. D. Laswell has used an admirable technique adopted from the economists. It is a species of political logical positivism and involves the study at quantitative semantics.²

Throughout his writing, the concept of power was an ever-present focus. His drawing of attention to power combined an empirical intent with a unity of science desire. In Power and Society,³ written in the early 50's, Laswell expressed this view

¹Harold Laswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930); Harold Laswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936); Harold Laswell et al., Language and Politics (New York: G.W. Stewart, 1949).

²Crick, The American Science of Politics, p. 189.

³Harold Laswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).

clearly with his co-author Abraham Kaplan:

We deal with power as a process in time, constituted by experimentally localized and observable acts.¹

After World War II, Laswell, still embracing empirical methods and the desire to develop a systematic level of generalization for political study, turned additionally to the question of "knowledge for what." He proposed that political science marshal its scientific techniques to help solve pressing public problems. He defined policy sciences as:

the disciplines concerned with explaining the policy making and public executing processes, and with locating data and providing interpretations which are relevant to the policy problems of a given period.²

Accordingly, political scientists would identify problems, find solutions, and transform these solutions into public policy.

In establishing policy science, Laswell was careful to continue his strong advocacy of empirical theory. In Power and Society, Laswell attempted to separate modern from earlier political theory by drawing an empirical-normative dichotomy.

Many of the most influenced political writing--that of Plato, Locke, Rousseau, the Federalists, and others--has not been concerned with political inquiry at all, but with justification of existent or proposed political structures. We say such works formulate political doctrine not political science.³

¹Ibid., p. xiii.

²David Lerner and Harold Laswell, eds., The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in the Scope and Method (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951), p. 14.

³Laswell and Kaplan, Power and Society, p. xiii.

Laswell adds:

we are not concerned with the justification of democratic values or their derivation from some moral or metaphysical base. This is the providence of political doctrine not political science.¹

What he goes on to advance is what he calls "hominocentric politics."

As a science it finds its subject matter in interpersonal relationships, not abstract institutions or organizations, and it sees the person in the whole. Not as the embodiment of this or that set of needs or interests.²

Laswell's presidential address was fittingly concerned with the relationship of political science to the impact of the biological, and physical sciences, and of engineering as well, for public policy. In speaking to this point he declared, as he had earlier, that political science was a policy science--par excellence, and entitled his address, "Political Science and Science."³

Overall the development of Laswell's thinking reflects two major, non-contradictory trends. One, the increasing emphasis on the higher value of empirical based political science, and secondly, the increasing emphasis upon aiding the government in fashioning public policy.

¹Ibid., pp. xiii-xiv. ²Ibid., p. xxiv.

³Harold Laswell, "The Political Science of Science," American Political Science Review L (December 1956).

From Pragmatism to Positivism

The speed with which the behavioral approach developed in the 1950's is reflected in the way in which scholars in the Association dealt with it. In 1956 the Association formally recognized the interests of a substantial number of behavioralists by including a series of panel discussions on political behavior. By 1959 the separate special panels were abandoned and instead behavioral oriented presentations were incorporated into all of the regular panels.

The research preferences of the Association presidents also reflected the rise of behavioral eminence. Laswell's term was followed by V. O. Key, E. E. Schattschneider and R. Taylor Cole. Each of these three are recognized for their contributions to the behavioral approach, but none of them demonstrated any call for exclusive reliance on empirical knowledge.

The next two presidents, Carl Swisher and Emmette Redford, were the last Association presidents who could not be identified as belonging to the behavioral school. Swisher's field being American public law was grounded in traditional methods of historical and institutional analysis.

Emmette Redford, in his address to the Association took time to speak about what he saw as the excesses of scientific methods.¹

¹Emmette Redford, "Reflections on a Discipline," American Political Science Review LV (December 1961):758. "Currently the greatest danger is perhaps the distortion of emphasis by the expectancies of science--the development of a systematic theory based on propositions validated by empirical data."

Redford warned of the "hazard" should we fail to recognize the value in a variety of approaches to knowledge about public affairs.¹

In fearing that other pursuits of normative, historical and prescriptive inquiry might be sacrificed to the positivistic view of science, he declared values as integral to political science. To the point he says that "behavioralism will not be successful since it fails to see the utmost of importance for values and value questions in political science."²

Following Redford's term in 1961, the next series of behavioral presidents--Charles Hyneman, Carl Friedrich, and C. Herman Prichett--were all advocates of empirical and behavioral approaches. None of the three could, however, be classed as extreme supporters of an exclusively scientific-behavioral political science.

C. Herman Prichett is yet another figure who, although a major advocate of behavioralism, opposed any movement that would lessen the status of non-behavioral methodologies. Prichett was a central figure in the development of the study of public law to include the analyzing of judicial behavior. His bloc method of analyzing voting alignments and his "boxscore" method of attitude analysis were classic developments in the shift from seeing the court as mainly a legal enunciator towards perceiving it as a conflict resolver.³

In speaking of the need for both empirical and constitutional study in the subfield of public law, Prichett reflected a behavior-

¹Ibid., p. 757. ²Ibid., p. 759.

³C. Herman Prichett, The Roosevelt Court (New York: Macmillan, 1948); C. Herman Prichett, Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

alism which desired a multi-methodological field of public law and no doubt the entire discipline.

Hopefully the field of public law, having demonstrated that its data can be put on scalograms and measured by a Shaply-Shubik power-index, will remain catholic enough to accommodate those political scientists who continue to find interest in the data of constitutional history, judicial biography, jurisprudence, the philosophy of judges, and the commentaries on the Supreme Court decisions. There are traditionalists and behavioralists who think that the gate is straight and the way narrow into the public law kingdom, but a more sensible text for all to contemplate is that old Chinese saying, "Let a hundred flowers 'bloom.'"¹

This type of behavioralism, still embracing other methods including history and humanistic studies, was countered by a narrow approach to methods. This narrow view identified empirical and scientific methods as having a higher value than historical or philosophical study. Under this logic behavioralism, as science, was given special status.

In the late 1960's a series of Association presidents would adhere to a hegemonic aspiration for empirical knowledge. In 1961, Robert Dahl, long a contributor to empirical thinking, saw it possible to conceive of the new behavioral approach as established and to characterize it as a successful protest against unscientific ways of thinking.

The successive elections of David Truman, Gabriel Almond, Robert Dahl, and David Easton recognized leaders in the behavioral approach, brought to office those who had attempted, as Redford

¹C. Herman Prichett, "Public Law and Judicial Behavior," in Political Science: Advance of a Discipline, ed. Marian D. Irish (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 219.

had feared, to narrow the discipline. This narrowing would be attempted in various ways but basically it moved to exclude approaches which were not empirical and descriptive, employing different arguments and logics.

CHAPTER VIII

POSITIVISTIC PRESIDENTS

Robert Dahl

Robert Dahl was elected association president following Truman and Almond in 1967. He had been highly influential in American political science over the past two decades. Dahl's democratic theory was very similar to Shumpeter's earlier work. In placing highest value on stability, mass movements were disapproved and the government through elites was advanced as more functionally democratic. In addition, Dahl advanced a concept of democracy which he based solely on empirical criteria found in existing social orders. He named this empirical construction "polarchy" or "polyarchal democracy" and saw it as the rule of multiple minorities under requirements for democratic elections.¹

In advancing this theory in Preface to Democratic Theory, America was seen as already a cohesive society which had fulfilled his requirements for democracy.² His theory of democracy was then extremely descriptive in that empirical evidence from the many behavioral studies refutes or supports the presence of democracy just the same way such evidence would refute or support

¹Robert Dahl, Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 62, 73-74, 87.

²Ibid., pp. 124-51.

a descriptive or explanatory proposition. Accordingly Dahl saw, in mirroring the natural sciences that: whether a proposition is true or false depends on the degree to which that proposition and the real world correspond.¹ Dahl also rejects any notion of democracy as prescriptive, that is as developing value standards. He rejects the position as not treatable by empirical knowledge.²

Concerning the relationship of behavioral methodology with various historical and philosophical methods, Dahl is not careful to mince words. He cites in extremely descriptive fashion:

the empirical political scientist is concerned with what is, not what ought to be. Hence he finds it difficult and uncongenial to assume the historic burden of the political philosopher who attempted to prescribe, elaborate, and employ ethical standards or values, to use the fashionable term, in appraising political acts and political systems. The behavioral student of politics is prepared to describe values as empirical data but qua scientist he seeks to avoid prescription or inquiry into the grounds in which judgements of values can properly be made.³

Speaking directly to historical method, Dahl goes on to say:

In his concern for analyzing what is, the behavioral political scientist has found it difficult to make systematic use of what has been, i.e., with history. . . .I am speaking here of the historian. Despite

¹Robert Dahl and Dean Neubauer, eds., Readings in Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 8.

²This is apparent in the "Walker-Dahl Exchange"; see Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitists Theory of Democracy," American Political Science Review LX (June 1966): also Robert Dahl, "Further Reflections on The Elitists Theory of Democracy," American Political Science Review LX (June 1966).

³Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach," pp. 767-68.

disclaimers and intentions to the contrary, there seems to be little room for doubt that the actual content of almost all of the studies that reflect the behavioral mood is a-historical in character.¹

To this Dahl adds, "I judge that the behavioral approach is not that of the speculative philosopher, the historian, the legalist, or the moralist."²

Combined with his exclusive reliance on empirical knowledge was his belief that the success of behavioralism will be marked not by a simple acceptance as another perspective or approach to the study of politics but an ability to supersede other methods by its close relationship to the canons and conventions of science. In keeping with his ideas about behavioralism success Dahl remarked:

it will become, and in fact is already becoming, incorporated into the main body of the discipline. The behavioral mood will not disappear, then, because it has failed. It will disappear rather because it has succeeded. As a somewhat sectarian, slightly factual outlook it will be the first victim of its own triumph.³

David Easton

The final president during the period when the Association was most representative of American political science as a whole was David Easton.

Although taking office in 1969, Easton's career and influence stretched back over two decades. During the period he expressed himself on a number of theoretical and methodological issues. His

¹Ibid., p. 769. ²Ibid., p. 763. ³Ibid., p. 770.

three major writings up to that time, The Political System (1953), A Framework for Political Analysis (1965), and Systems Approach to Political Life (1965),¹ constitute some of the most important works on empirical theory. In these writings, Easton sets down what he sees as the problems with past and present studies of politics, clarifies the nature of scientific theory and its role in empirical research, and offers a scientific theory in the form of a conceptual framework for political analysis. An examination of the above positions plus some clarification of Easton's view of values will show him to be strongly attached to the positivistic epistemology, which had fully blossomed by the end of this decade.

Besides being representative of positivism in American political science, Easton is most indicative of the innovations of the second phase of behavioralism in which developments in quantitative techniques were secondary to the establishment of empirical theory building.² As a result of this work, systemic case analysis, content analysis, aggregate statistical analysis, and causal modeling have all been developed.

¹Easton, The Political System; David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965); David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965).

²David Easton writes, "[Political Science] has been undergoing two revolutions simultaneously. Political science has come to scientific method about the same time that social sciences as a whole have been shifting their emphasis from the methods of research alone to theory as well . . . Political science is in the process of absorbing the basic assumptions of scientific method at the same time it proceeds to the equally trying task of giving meaning to the behavior studied by relating it to some empirical theoretical context." Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, pp. 17-18.

In his first theoretical writings, The Political System, one of the most popular books in American political science, Easton discussed the shortcomings of the study of politics in America. In this view, the state of political science has not become what it should be because the theoretical function within the discipline has been inadequately performed. The causes of this inadequacy are varied, but rest strongly with what Easton identifies as the decline into historicism which stands as a barrier to empirical theory building.

Easton holds an evolutionary view of American political science corresponding to a strong biological perspective which prevails over most of his work. In this idea of evolutionary development, he agrees with Truman and Almond, about the jump from 'traditional' to scientific-empirical modes of inquiry. He also agrees in his presidential address about the dominance of one mode of thought in the form of a research paradigm. Thus every discipline is a captive of a set of fundamental assumptions or a research paradigm.¹

His particular view of developments in American political science saw the early realists as "hyperfactualists." They are assailed for amassing a great amount of data, but remaining in the traditional institutional level of inquiry. They were, therefore, too confined to governmental structures and juristic frameworks of thought. Their flaw was the inadequacy of failing to pass beyond legal structures to

¹David Easton, "The New Revolution in Political Science," American Political Science Review LXIII (December 1969):1053.

the political matrix which conditioned it. Thus it is possible to speak of the rise of theoretical constructions that are "a break with the past, the enormity of which is only slowly being absorbed into the consciousness of political scientists."¹

The Political System treats another major problem with American political science, the lack of faith in scientific knowledge due to the strong presence of historicism. This pessimism has been responsible for the lack of scientific theory in political science. Historicists are viewed as caught in the study of the classical theories of the past.²

Easton is most distressed by the epistemology of historicism which, in pointing to the idea of tacit value assumptions present in all knowledge, lessens the truth value of empirical science. He cites historicism as that philosophy in which "there can be no universal truths except perhaps the one truth that all ideas are a product of a historical period and cannot transcend it."³

Writers in the positivist tradition have typically believed that there are uniformities in the phenomenal world independent of person, time, or place, to which empirical theory is to conform so as to be valid. Verification is seen in relating empirical theory to empirical facts of experience. Easton holds to the view that

¹David Easton, ed., Varieties of Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 2.

²Easton, The Political System, pp. 233-54.

³Ibid., p. 235.

there is a real world of objective facts that can be learned through scientific inquiry. He contends that it is possible to establish theoretical knowledge which is objectively valid if checked with facts. In The Political System, Easton writes, "Systematic theory corresponds at the level of thought to the concrete empirical political system of daily life."¹

In his presidential address, Easton acknowledges the "post-behavioral revolution," but concedes nothing as he says that the two movements, regardless of how it contradicts the historicism present, can "convert the study of politics into a more rigorously scientific discipline modeled on the methodology of the natural sciences."² This speaks to the relatively low impact of this so-called revolt.

He identifies two types of empirical theories. Allocative is that which focuses attention on factors that contribute to the kinds of decisions or allocations that a political system makes. These are the major contemporary approaches to a general theory of politics such as the focuses on groups, decision-making, and power. The second type is systems theory which, according to Easton, regards what allocative systems take for granted, namely a biological imperative-persistence.

In explaining the need for a general theory of politics, Easton clarifies the nature of empirical theory building. In theory

¹Ibid., pp. 97-98.

²Easton, "The New Revolution," p. 1051.

building he sees three levels of generalizations. These are singular, synthetic, and systematic or general theory.¹

The first, singular, is not scientific. It observes uniformities between two isolated, observable variables. Synthetic, which is scientific, is the building of a set of interrelated propositions that are designed to synthesize data contained in an unorganized body of singular generalizations. It is scientific since it seeks to find uniform relationships between variables which can ultimately provide a conceptual framework for the entire range of political study.

Systematic or general theory consists of a framework of concepts by reference to which the political scientist can identify and isolate phenomena of a political nature. These concepts thus conform to the relevant elements or variables of political life. It contains orienting concepts and principles of relationships amongst concepts. In its most mature form, general theory is viewed as a deductive system, such that from a few basic premises there follows a series of narrower generalizations and finally a singular generalization that can be tested empirically.

In regards to general theory in its mature form, Easton believes its time has not yet arrived. He does, however, see the first step in that direction to be the construction of a conceptual framework for political science. His systems theory, although not a mature general theory, is the important step of a conceptual framework. He believes

¹Easton, The Political System, pp. 52-57.

that the systems approach by depicting the major variables of the political system and their possible relations gives meaning, coherence, and direction to research. It can facilitate the comparison of research findings, point to areas where new research is needed, and indicate the data that is relevant to political research, thus providing a criteria of relevance to guide research.

The hegemonic aspirations of Easton's scientific methodology are apparent in his design for the systems model to limit the area of the political, applying his formula not on an instrumental or heuristic basis, but as an ontology of political life.¹

A final identification of David Easton's political science is necessary in the area of his value position. How does he use the term? What type of status are values given? Does his theoretical position favor or promote serious inquiry about ends of political life? These are questions in need of clarification.

Easton, very early in his writing, separated facts from values. He distinguished, in positivistic fashion, between value and causal theory. Value theory is identified as the state of affairs theorists would like to see.² It is thus relegated to the status of opinion or advocacy.

Causal theory is identified as that which stresses relationships amongst facts. It is objective, empirical, and scientific. Its

¹"Systems theory provides a comprehensive matrix for the entire range of political theory." Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, p. 10.

²Easton, The Political System, pp. 309-14.

status is, therefore, much higher than that accorded to values; and the separation is evident. The importance of values lay in their ability to be recognized. This Weberian view seeks to identify values, so as to bring them to the direct consciousness of the research worker. Easton saw opinions and biases as a true obstacle to empirical research. This obstacle, however, is not insurmountable, but rather, like Weber believed, capable of being identified and thus placed outside of the product of a conscientious scientist.¹

This position shows a major disagreement with historicism, which asserts tacit value assumptions in all types of knowledge, a point which Easton recognized in his treatment of it in The Political System.

Easton displays a positivistic orientation when he recognizes values as not rational responses but belonging to the non-cognitive realm of material interests and passions. Accordingly, all values become equally unfounded in reasons. Following from this, values are reduced to emotional responses conditioned by an individual's desires, ideals, and emotions, and thus cannot be established as true or false, unlike facts which subject themselves to empirical verifications.²

Overall, Professor Easton's theoretical position does not foster any serious inquiry about the ends of political life. He denies any intrinsic value is present in any values and thus

¹Ibid., pp. 225-27. ²Ibid., pp. 66-87.

deprecates any natural law postulates, seeing them as a desire to advance one's own prescription at the cost of objectivity. His systems theory shows no concern about the ideological nature of the system since it does not stress the maintenance of any particular regime or political order.

In his use of the term values in 'the authoritative allocation of values,' this refers to a non-ethical position of goods that people desire. The 'authoritative' accents a psychological thought not a moral prescription.¹ Systems theory thus stresses process and persistence rather than formal institutions or political ethics.

David Easton's writings thus represent a strong positivism. Political Science is limited to empirical inquiry. Values are given the dubious status of a psychological response. Overall positivist dogma remains unquestioned and supported as facts and values remain divided and of different status and worth.

¹Ibid., p. 221.

CHAPTER IX

THOMAS KUHN: THE KUHNIAN APPRAISAL OF SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINES

The Kuhnian Paradigm

The appearance of Thomas Kuhn's thesis on the development of scientific disciplines¹ in the presidential addresses of David Truman and Gabriel Almond brings to light personal positions of interest, since they propound a rationale for narrowing the scope and methods of the discipline. This narrowing would take place not through exclusion but from a lessening of status of all but the perceived dominant research model.

Truman and Almond were not alone as many political scientists, particularly those supporting a scientific political science, adopted Kuhn's view of scientific development. In their application of it to political science each made particular alterations and reservations.

Kuhn's writing was by the mid-60's very much read and taken to heart by political scientists. This was performed without the consent of Kuhn himself, who in later writings denied that paradigms exist in the social sciences and questioned the relevance of his thesis and concepts to the social sciences.

¹Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

Kuhn wrote:

I claim no therapy to assist the transformation of a proto-science to a science, nor do I suppose that anything of this sort is to be had. If as Feyarabend suggests, some social scientists take from me the view that the status of their field can be changed by first legislating agreement on fundamentals and then turning to puzzle solving, they are badly misconstruing my point.¹

This position by Kuhn was combined with the irony that Kuhn, whose theory of scientific change is a brand of historicism, was used by positivistic behavioralists as support for their program. There was little apparent recognition of the extent to which this historicist philosophy of non-objective and non-rational scientific development jeopardize the foundations of behavioralism.² Kuhn did not see science as cumulative, and is closer to Karl Mannheim and Steven Toulmin on the influence of sociology in knowledge. The great balancer to these contradictions was that Kuhn's thesis and concepts fit extremely well into a rationale for those advancing the merits and higher status of a scientific study of politics.

What Kuhn presents is a theory of scientific development contingent upon the activity of the relevant professional group concerned with it. These disciplines are subject to and part of a socialization process whereby values as to the proper research

¹Thomas S. Kuhn, "Reflections on My Critics," in Criticism and Growth of Knowledge, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 244.

²Gabriel Almond recognizes this when he notes that: "He [Kuhn] understates the element of continuity, of cumulativeness." Gabriel Almond, "Political Theory and Political Science," American Political Science Review LX (December 1966):875.

procedures are instilled. Kuhn believed that the way scientists looked at a phenomena was part of a disciplinary matrix which set the rules of operations to be studied and methods of verification.

Recognition of the existence of a uniquely competent professional group and acceptance of its role as exclusive arbiter of professional achievement has further implications. The group's members, as individuals, and by virtue of these shared training and experiences must be seen as the sole possessors of the rules of the game or some equivalent basis for unequivocal judgements.¹

Kuhn therefore moves away from individual intellectual activity and instead looks at science in terms of the group. It appears that it is the sociology of practitioners rather than objective truth that dominates scientific development. Science is viewed, not as a cumulative accretion of knowledge which is building, and widening, but composed of epochs. These epochs come about in radical shifts involving the rejection of past theories and methods as outmoded. Kuhn writes:

This way a new theory, however successful in its range of applications, is seldom or never an increment to what is already known. Its assimilation requires the reconstruction of prior theory and the reevaluating of prior fact, an intrinsically revolutionary process that is seldom completed by one man and never overnight.²

Specifically Kuhn sees mature scientific disciplines as captives of dominant research models which he calls a paradigm which is:

¹Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolution, p. 129.

²Ibid., p. 7.

an accepted example of actual scientific practice--examples which include law, theory, application and instrumentation together--which provides models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research.¹

In its established usage, a paradigm becomes the accepted research model. It is not meant as an object of replication but as a guide to proper research. As disciplinary matrices they set the tone for an entire area of study and provide a great deal of unity to that area. Disciplines, through the acceptance of a dominant paradigm, are seen as forming a community based on agreement which extends to rules governing inquiry and to stipulations concerning what is to qualify as scientific questions and answers.

It is here that the hegemonic position of a paradigm leads to monopolization and exclusion of alternative methods and theories. The paradigm is seen as a monolith since it defines the legitimate problems; Kuhn says: "Work under the paradigm can proceed in no other way, and to desert the paradigm is to cease practicing science."²

Since the community has defined the problems it will admit, "other problems, including many that had previously been standard, are rejected as metaphysical, as the concerns of another discipline, or sometimes as just too problematical to be worth the time."³ Combined with this idea of paradigm development and the community of scholars is the linkage of disciplinary development with paradigm establishment and rejection.

¹Ibid., p. 10. ²Ibid., p. 32. ³Ibid., p. 37.

Kuhn believes that it is possible to gauge disciplinary development in terms of the existence of a dominant paradigm. A discipline without one is seen as a proto-science or in a pre-paradigmatic stage. A discipline with an established paradigm is cast as a mature or normal science.

Ever since pre-history or antiquity one field of study after another has crossed the dividing line between what the historian might call its pre-history as a science and its history proper.¹

Kuhn thus makes a pre-dominant paradigm-dominant paradigm dichotomy in differentiating between a mature science and a proto-science. Mature sciences are themselves subject to paradigm rejection and change. The paradigm challenging the established one is termed an "extraordinary science."

Paradigms are accepted mainly for their ability to solve problems. Kuhn says that "paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their competitors at solving the problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute."² When unsolvable problems, which Kuhn calls "anomalies," accumulate the paradigm faces rejection. Rejection, according to Kuhn, does not come unless there is a suitable replacement. This is important as it stresses affirmation in addition to falsification. The affirmation is present in the extraordinary science which employs a paradigm that is determined to look differently at the scope and methods of the study.

¹Ibid., p. 21. ²Ibid., p. 23.

Since anomalous findings do not result in rejection Kuhn finds mere falsification, such as that advanced by Karl Popper, unacceptable in itself. It must be joined with the logical empiricist criterion of verification.

The new paradigm like the old is accepted more on disciplinary faith than objective truth. If it is accepted, the extraordinary science will become the status quo and establish itself as a mature science.

Once a paradigm is accepted its enforcement rests on the discipline's ability to institutionalize the model by fostering its use and suppressing competing and past models. Progress for a discipline is contingent upon its ability to enforce its dominant paradigm.

Kuhn advanced a "textbook" approach to this process. Textbooks employing the acceptable paradigm are mastered by students in their formative years. They master these texts at the expense of past classics; the reason being that these textbooks show how the great achievements of the past have aided in setting up the present paradigm, and why they have been discarded is essential. These textbooks thus display an idea of methodological change rather than cumulativeness, and Kuhn stresses the socialization process involved in the use of textbooks to pass along a particular methodology, through paradigm study.¹

¹"The study of paradigms . . . is what mainly prepares the student for membership in the particular scientific community in which he will later practice in." Ibid., p. 11.

It appears that the importance of Kuhn's work is in the way he views scientific change as part of disciplinary development, and maturity. This maturity reflecting itself in the exclusion of past or competing methodologies since disciplinary development is seen as a process of revolutionary, non-cumulative change.

Paradigms and a Scientific Political Science

The application of Kuhn's ideas about the nature of scientific development to American political science was by the mid-1960's commonplace. Kuhn's concepts and ideas were used as support and evidence of different developments, regardless of contradiction or paradox. Martin Landau took note of this fashion, that:

This is a scenario that has overwhelmed political science. Its appeal has been so powerful, so universally compelling, that it seems as if a massive conversion experience has taken place within political science today, all sides of the science controversy derive sustenance and solace from the Book of Kuhn.¹

Kuhn's thesis was applied to American political science in three basic ways, from which variations develop due to combination or minor modification, since neither are exclusive of one another.

First there is the use of Kuhn's paradigm in a broad sense as criteria for a model or formulation. It is possible then that paradigm became another way of saying theory, model, or set of theories. The development implications need not be taken into

¹Landau, Political Science, p. 58.

account in this application, nor the question of dominance.¹

A second basic form is to apply Kuhn's views as to the nature of scientific development in assessing the history of the discipline. Kuhn's view of history as set in epochs of pre-scientific and dominant paradigm divisions is applied to an interpretation of methodological changes in American political science. In assessing the existence of paradigms, either historical or contemporary, it was necessary to decide such variations as whether political science had or presently has a paradigm or paradigms.² If it has a paradigm, is it in competition with another? A final question is, if it is gaining one, is this development desirable?

A third position, closely linked to the other two, is the use of the paradigm perspective to lessen the status of competing methods about politics by speaking of different stages as pre-paradigmatic, or contemporary and future methods as mature or normal science. This lessening of status on one hand and elevation on another can construct a position whereby a discipline is narrowed in the name of a dominant paradigm and a mature science.³

¹Robert T. Holt and John M. Richardson, Jr., "Competing Paradigms in Comparative Politics," in The Methodology of Comparative Research, ed. Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner (New York: Free Press, 1970), p. 21.

²Philip Beardsley denies that political science has ever had a dominant paradigm. See Philip Beardsley, "Political Science: The Case of the Missing Paradigm," Political Theory II (February 1974): 46-61.

³Sheldon Wolin sees behavioralism as the now dominant paradigm. "The extent of this transformation is such that to suggest that the study of politics is now dominated by the belief that the main objective--inquiring scientific knowledge about politics--depends

Professors Truman and Almond apply all three positions as they both look forward to the day when political science establishes a scientific paradigm and qualifies as a mature science.

It can be said that it is striking the way modern behavioralism parallels Kuhn's ideas about a successful paradigm. This, however, often requires either a loose interpretation or a misreading of past history.

An examination of the way David Truman and Gabriel Almond treated Kuhn in service to their own ends shows the heightening of the status of empirical-scientific political science at the expense of co-existing methodologies. It appears that both men applied Kuhn as a rationale for narrowing the field to give special legitimacy to scientific positivistic political science.

Behavioralism is treated as a paradigm which moves political science towards a mature scientific discipline and rejects and

upon the adoption and refinement of specific techniques and that to be qualified and certified as a political scientist is tantamount to possessing prescribed techniques. Concurrent with this development there has been an effort to imbue political scientists with what is understood as the ethics of science: objectivity, detachment, fidelity to fact, and deference to intersubjective verification by a community of practitioners. These changes add up to a vocation, a *vita methodica*, which includes a specific set of skills, a mode of practice, and an informing ethic. This vocation and the education it requires may mark the significance of the behavioral revolution." Sheldon Wolin, "Political Theory as a Vocation," American Political Science Review LXIII (December 1969):1063-64.

¹"From such a vantage point behavioralism may be treated if only metaphorically, as an attempt to move political science from a pre-paradigmatic (or literally non-scientific) condition to a paradigmatic stage, or alternatively, as an attempt to replace a previously accepted paradigm with one that is more powerful." Somit and Tanenhaus, The Development of Political Science, p. 175.

replaces traditional methods. The slow development of behavioralism is reinterpreted to fit Kuhn's idea of methodological revolutions and methodological dominance.

David Truman

David Truman in his 1965 speech to the American Political Science Association, upon his election to the presidency, adopted Kuhn's explanation of scientific development in his assessment of the history and future of the discipline. There were only a few minor alterations, as Kuhn's thesis was conveniently changed from a theory about natural sciences to that of relevance to a social science intent upon imitating the natural sciences.

Although Truman does admonish himself for the "sin of parochialism," he nevertheless is quite willing to look at political science, as practiced in America, as an American enterprise. This enables him to apply Kuhn's concept of methodological developments. The idea of methodological development along Kuhnian lines is expressed in the title "Disillusion and Regeneration: The Quest for a Discipline," which implies that as a discipline we have not yet arrived, and that its past has consisted of epochs tried and discarded.¹

Truman accents the importance of methodological developments, declaring in his address that:

¹David Truman, "Disillusion and Regeneration: The Quest for a Discipline," American Political Science Review LIX (December 1965).

a discipline, at least to the initiated is known more by the questions it asks than the answers it provides. . . . Clearly the discipline is undergoing redefinition or at least an attempt at redefinition that may significantly alter its meaning. If the criteria for admitting questions and validating answers is changed, the discipline itself is changed.¹

What these important changes are is evidenced in the importance of the systems approach as a framework for analysis, the ascendance of empirical theory, and what Truman sees as a general faith in scientific method.

Truman at first says that political science has never had a paradigm. This, however, applies only to a strict interpretation, and we are told that for all practical purposes the discipline has had a number of paradigms.²

The Truman idea of a paradigm, which is entirely similar to Kuhn's, is that of a common set of disciplinary beliefs constituting a kind of an open-ended model, that explicitly defines its problems and methods.³

Truman contends that political science was dominated by a particular paradigm from 1880 until 1930, whereby anomalies arose which caused its rejection. This rejection was, however, delayed until after World War II. What followed, diverging somewhat from Kuhn, who sees any dominant paradigm rejection accompanied by immediate replacement, was a period of a multi-paradigm political science.

Given the looseness and especially the lack of precision in the prevailing implicit agreement on what to do and how to proceed in the field, its weakening and general dissolution were bound to be followed by a confusion of competing and divergent, if not incompatible views of

¹Ibid., p. 865. ²Ibid. ³Ibid.

the appropriate questions to be asked and the proper methods to be used. How long this state of affairs is likely to exist is anyone's guess.¹

Truman suggests three future developments, and views the first two as undesirable.

First, it may be that the discipline is so isolated from its environment that it will have to wait for a broad intellectual or social movement to give it illicit coherence, as the progressive movement seems to have done in the formulative years. If it should be so, the wait I suspect, will be a long one. A second possibility is that segments, at least, of the discipline have grown self-conscious enough to supply their own momentum and their own modes of coherence. These may then develop as increasing divergent and separate schools with little in common except some raw data, and possibly, but not necessarily, a departmental label.²

The third possibility, which he hopes for, is that the discipline will be united under a dominant paradigm.

Most of the discipline may have acquired a degree of self-awareness sufficient to set the outlines of what to do, if not altogether how to proceed, without total dependence on dominant currents of thoughts in the environment and without the widening cleavages in both conception and procedure that the second possibility would involve.³

Besides this general optimism there are three basic reasons for the appearance of a dominant paradigm. The first and most basic reason is the development of the systems approach and the interest it has attracted. Truman sees the systems approach involving:

Man's awareness of the simple but important assumption that the phenomena of politics in any sphere are interrelated in persistent or recurrent patterns. More important than the awareness itself is that it has involved explicit examination of the relationship amongst things political--efforts to specify forms or

¹Ibid., p. 869. ²Ibid. ³Ibid.

types of systems, the elements involved in them, the factors associated with alterations in systems, and probable implications of these forms and mutations for the strength of specified values.¹

The appearance of the systems approach as a common framework of analysis by which political needs can be systematically studied provides the basic form of the desired dominant paradigm. It will be made possible and supported by the next two developments. The first is the "growth and necessary conjunction of theory and empirical investigation,"² which provides for the scientific methodology needed to expand a systematic study and an objective political science.

A third motivation towards dominant paradigm development is the general intellectual temper. Truman believes that the intellectual environment is highly supportive of science and scientific methodologies.

Truman uses a textbook analysis similar to Kuhn as evidence of this increased commitment to the goals of science.

I cite as an illustration an impression that the mass of textbooks in all parts of the field today show a degree of care, at least about consistency of assumptions and coherence of³ expository framework that was null thirty years ago.

Truman thus moved to use Kuhn's philosophy of developing science to legitimate his desire that political science gain the stature of a mature science by mirroring its qualifications. Political science, he believed, could be developed on more empirical

¹Ibid. ²Ibid., p. 870. ³Ibid.

lines with a general framework of analysis providing a unity, and thus avoiding undesirable "sectarianism."¹ This unity would require that the systems approach become the central focus of the discipline at the exclusion of other methods; Truman says,

the centrality of systems consideration will make less permissible the analysis of an institutional segment or process without reference to an explicit conception of the system to which it relates.²

If Truman's optimism is warranted, political science will become a mature or normal science by satisfying Kuhn's conceptualization of what is a mature science. Thomas Kuhn had thus become the needed rationale for a political science which desires to gain the status perceived to be held by the natural sciences. It is ironic that such a relativistic view of scientific development could be used to support the desires of a positivistic political science. Regardless, Gabriel Almond in his following address proceeded to follow the same logic.

Gabriel Almond

When Gabriel Almond, in his presidential address in 1966, applied Kuhn's concepts to the evaluation of political science and its history, the intent and conclusions were the same as his predecessor. The systems approach and a strongly empirical methodology will provide the paradigm by which political science will be considered a normal science with status equal to the natural sciences. Almond did make some additions and variations

¹Ibid. ²Ibid.

to Truman's interpretation which help to fully establish his own particular view.

Almond agrees with Truman that scientific development is very much a part of disciplinary acceptance and sociology. He speaks about this point saying:

let me first develop my theory by the back door so to speak, through some comments on the sociology of political science, arguing that we are becoming a science in the magnitude, structure, age distribution and intellectual environment of the profession.¹

Almond agrees with Truman that political science is in a period of immense change, but is much more confident that a new paradigm is being established. This process also involves the rejection and replacement of a past dominant paradigm, which is a "formulation of the subject matter of political analysis, specifying variables, parameters, and their relations and consequences."²

He goes back much further than Truman in assessing the initial paradigm, finding it in the scholarly papers of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The basis of this paradigm, which was linked to classical political theory, formalism, and democratic ideals of the state, was the method of historical analysis and prediction. This methodology was founded upon a belief represented in the enlightenment theory of progress through history and rationality. Its rejection was due to the appearance of anomalies that had proved its ineffectiveness.

¹Almond, "Political Theory and Political Science," p. 869.

²Ibid., p. 875.

A transitional development in the rejection process was the appearance of the realists, such as Woodrow Wilson and James Bryce. They are noted for their rejection of the formalism and natural law biases of the initial paradigm. They aided in the establishment of an empirical movement, but are recognized as deficient. This deficiency was, that since theorizing was frowned upon, it lacked any general theoretical polemic. In addition, historical analysis based on the theory of progress had not yet lost favor.

Historical prediction awaited the final anomalies. The negative reception of democracy in Europe and elsewhere plus the increased utility of empirical methods of research both proved that history was lacking as a tool of analysis and prediction. Another anomaly which brought the end to the initial paradigm was that it lacked any real concern with political process.¹ These developments were part of the "final anomaly--the disproof of enlightenment historical predictions, which breaks the back of the traditional conceptual scheme and an era of theoretical speculation of new candidates for a paradigm begins."² With nothing to replace it with, political science, again contradictory to Kuhn, is seen as floating because of the lack of any dominant paradigm.

Almond, however, as I have noted, sees the new dominant paradigm being established. This new paradigm has four features.

The first is the statistical approach to the universe of political systems, which no longer looks at just great powers, but is concerned with man's total universe.

¹Ibid., p. 871. ²Ibid., p. 875.

The second feature of the emerging paradigm is the methodological techniques of:

the differentiation and specification of variables, and the assumptions of probability and reflexivity in their relation. Thus in our effort to establish the proper type of political systems, compare them with each other, and classify them into types, we explicitly separate structure from function, structure from culture, social systems from political systems, empirical properties from their normative implications. . . .The result is a movement away from some black and white typecasting, towards classification based on probability of process and performance patterns which enable us to compare, explain, and evaluate more precisely.¹

The third characteristic is that of the emergence of the political system as an analytical framework.

The final characteristic is that the enlightenment theory of progress is seen as:

giving way to a multi-linear theory of political development leading us to break through the historical and cultural parochialism of the field.²

In assessing political science methodology, historical methods gave way to anthropology and psychology, while theories of separation of powers and checks and balances are relegated to a lower importance.

Almond, like Truman, used Kuhn's views of scientific disciplines development and paralleled it to the rise and future of political science. The future political science is that of a highly positivistic, empirical political analysis, which would employ the systems framework as the central theoretical construction. Almond sees the hegemony brought by such a development as necessary, if

¹Ibid., p. 876. ²Ibid., p. 877.

political science is to reach the sought after goal of an empirical scientific discipline modeled on the natural sciences. Kuhn, regardless of the contradictions, helped to provide a rationale for such a prospect.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSIONS

Towards a Multi-methodological Political Science

It appears doubtful that any American political scientist would contend that there is no place for the application of scientific methods and data in the study of politics and government. The problem with scientific methodologies is that when combined with a positivistic theory of knowledge they can become exclusive and exclusionary. We thus face a hazard in that the belief in verifiable knowledge as the only true knowledge puts us in a position to denigrate and thus fail to appreciate the value of a variety of different approaches in political inquiry.

Any theory which, through empirical scientific hegemony, denies a place to uncongenial modes of inquiry, despite the fact that such methods have and will continue to exist, creates a peril for the entire discipline. To label alternative approaches as anachronisms or anomalies may add to the rhetoric of the status of the scientific study of politics, but does not give recognition to the necessity of a variety of methods in political analysis.

Scientific methodology has been a major development in the twentieth century. It has not, however, preempted other approaches which will continue to flourish in the American intellectual

environment. It is no doubt that behavioral oriented political scientists have come to have immense and perhaps inordinate power in the American Political Science Association. The 1970's appear to continue this trend as the so-called post-behavioral revolution has been far less revolutionary than many of its advocates and commentators have believed.

The post-behavioral and traditional approaches are generally not based on the rejection of scientific methods, but the rejection of its excessive application, since this threatens their relevance. In a sense, we are all scientists to the extent that we can realistically appreciate the value of scientific approaches in the social sciences.

It is evident that American political science will continue to be comprised of not one, but many orientations to political science; including scientific, law, behavior, philosophy, and history. A true advance for the discipline rests in its ability to enrich itself through appreciation of a multi-methodological character. Critical examination must be matched with methodological coexistence.

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